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Abstract
European integration forces system competition within European
countries. This competition has important implications for both the
public pay-as-you-go pension scheme and the public education
system. Without labor mobility, each generation has an incentive
to invest in the human capital of the subsequent generation in
order to maximize pension payments. It is a popular belief that
increasing labor mobility decreases the incentives to finance the
education of the subsequent generation. This paper shows that
this is not true if human capital investment increases the mobility
of the subsequent generation and can thus be used as a
commitment device for low taxes.
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In all industrialized countries, a large fraction of government spending is used for public edu-
cation. These transfers to the young amount to roughly 5 percent of GDP over all developed
countries. There are significant transfers to elderly people, too. About 8 percent of GDP is
redistributed via public pension schemes.
1 This paper analyzes how these transfers are af-
fected by increased labor mobility in Europe.
In a closed economy, investment in human capital faces a hold-up problem as human
capital becomes a fixed factor once the investment is made. Consequently, the optimal tax is
high given the human capital investment. Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996) analyze
the time consistency problem for a benevolent government and discuss the consequences this
problem has for the incentive to invest in human capital. Increased international mobility of
labor, however, changes the constraints which affect optimal education and tax policy. Kehoe
(1989) points out for the case of mobile capital that mobility can solve the hold-up problem of
time-consistent taxation for a benevolent government by acting as a partial commitment. In
this paper, we consider the case of mobile labor and show that in a non-altruistic, geronto-
cratic world, investment in human capital can be interpreted as a commitment device. Each
generation has an incentive to invest in the human capital of the subsequent generation if this
investment increases mobility and therefore restricts taxation.
The idea of the paper is the following. Assume that the population can be divided into
two generations - one young generation and one old generation. The young generation is first
educated and then starts to work. The old generation, which is the owner of the fixed factor, is
                                                
1 See e.g. OECD (1996), OECD (1999), and Thum (1999).2
retired and has the power to levy a tax on the young generation.
2 Thus it receives transfers in
addition to the income from the fixed factor. The taxes are set so as to extract the exact differ-
ence between the domestic wage and the wage abroad, which is the outside option for the
young generation. Anticipating this behavior, taxation has an effect on the education decision
of the young generation if education increases the domestic and the foreign productivity dif-
ferently. If, for example, a German worker is taught German law, this country-specific knowl-
edge would increase his labor productivity in Germany but does not affect her labor produc-
tivity in Italy. The reciprocal effect is true for foreign languages. To illustrate the effect on the
education decision, assume the extreme case where education increases domestic labor pro-
ductivity only (e.g. knowledge of the domestic law system). This productivity increase would
be fully taxed by the old generation. Therefore, the young generation would not have any in-
centive to invest in human capital at all. To avoid this outcome, the old generation would like
to commit itself credibly to a low taxation in the future, which would induce the young gen-
eration to invest in human capital. One feasible commitment device is to provide for skills,
e.g. foreign languages, that increase the wage abroad. A necessary condition for the feasibility
of this strategy, however, is the power to control the skill composition. This power can be
acquired by the old generation by providing the education.
Public education as a commitment device has already been analyzed in an altruistic
world. Gradstein (2000), for example, showed that the public provision of education might
reduce the threat of "aggressive" redistributive taxation in a median voter model compared to
the private provision of education.
3 This leads to a higher level of human capital accumulation
and, therefore, a faster growth of average income compared to a more differentiated private
education system. Therefore, publicly provided education serves as a commitment device pre-
                                                
2 Of course, the model can be interpreted in a much more general context. In fact, it is only necessary for the
results to hold that the politically decisive group receives income out of an immobile factor.
3 For the political economy of the mix of public and private provision of education see Gradstein (1996).3
venting efficiency losses. In our model, a different approach will be chosen without referring
to altruistic motives. Our model relies on the productivity effect of human capital investment
as a link between the young and the old generation allowing for migration.
4
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model for a small
country interacting with a large country. The second section adds the monetary costs of edu-
cation to the analysis. The consequences for the welfare state in the context of an aging popu-
lation are the focus of the last section, which also concludes and highlights some policy impli-
cations.
1. Education as a commitment device
How is public education affected by increased mobility? To answer this question, we intro-
duce a simple intergenerational model with two homogeneous generations where the old gen-
eration raises a lump-sum tax that has to be paid by the young generation.
5 It is assumed that
the old generation has the power to tax the young generation, i.e. there is a gerontocracy,
6 and
that the old generation is the owner of the fixed factor. This assumption in this extreme ver-
sion is not necessary for the result but eases the analysis significantly. Additionally, it is as-
sumed that production Y in the domestic country is determined by a function F
( ) L K F Y , = (1)
                                                
4 Konrad (1995a and 1995b) addresses the provision of education and infrastructure, however, in a somewhat
different context. Konrad (1995a) focuses on how the investment incentives are affected by increased mobility
with fiscal federalism; Konrad (1995b) discusses how these incentives change with population growth. Anders-
son and Konrad (2000a) abstract from intergenerational issues and focus on educational investment in a closed
and open economy without government or with a benevolent government. Andersson and Konrad (2000b) dis-
cuss the case of a Leviathan government.
5 In the one-generation framework of Andersson and Konrad (2000a), taxes and educational subsidies are set by
a benevolent government which makes a discussion of the appropriate objective function of the government
necessary. The Leviathan government in Andersson and Konrad (2000b) is therefore closer to our gerontocratic
framework.
6 See for example Konrad (1995a, 1995b) and the discussion in section 3.4
which depends on capital K and on labor expressed in efficiency units L, where L equals do-
mestically valuable human capital investment per worker I times the number of workers N
N I L = . (2)
The function ) (L F  is assumed to be concave in the amount of efficiency units L ( 0 > ¶ ¶ L F ,
and  0
2 2 < ¶ ¶ L F ).
The model has the following decision structure (cf. Figure 1). In the first stage, the old
generation decides about the composition of the educational program. This means that the old
generation determines which skills are taught in school. It is assumed that education can be
divided into one part that increases the domestic productivity (e.g. law of the domestic coun-
try) and one part that increases the productivity in the foreign country (e.g. foreign lan-
guages).
7 Let us define g as the fraction of education that increases only the domestic produc-
tivity.
Figure 1
1 2 3 4
Education:  g Tax:  t




In the second stage, each member of the young generation chooses the amount of education Z.
The amount of education Z multiplied by the part of the skills that increases domestic produc-
tivity g can be interpreted as investment in domestic human capital I
Z I g = . (3)
                                                
7 In reality, this separation can hardly be made, since foreign languages, for example, increase both the domestic
productivity and the foreign productivity. The focus of this analysis is, however, on the relative increase, which
justifies this theoretical separation. For simplicity, the part of education that increases productivity equally in
the home and in the foreign country (e.g. mathematical skills) is neglected in the analysis.5
Then the old generation sets the tax t in the third stage. Given this tax, the young generation
decides in the last stage whether to emigrate or to stay in the home country. The solution of
the model is obtained by solving the decision structure backwards.
8
1.1. Stage 4: Migration Decision
Each member of the young generation compares the wage in the home country with the wage
abroad. The domestic gross wage is given by the marginal product of labor
Z F F w L N g = = (4)
with  L F as the domestic wage per efficiency unit of labor. The foreign gross wage is
( ) [ ] Z w w g - ° = 1
F , (5)
with  ° w  as the constant foreign wage per efficiency unit of labor. It is assumed that the home
country is small compared to the foreign country, thus emigration does not affect the wage
abroad, i.e. the foreign marginal productivity of efficiency units of labor is constant. Symmet-
rical to the domestic country, a higher country-specific knowledge of the foreign country (i.e.
a higher ( ) g - 1 ) implies a higher wage abroad.
If the wage net of the lump-sum tax t in the home country is lower than the wage abroad,
migration takes place until the domestic net wage is equal to the wage abroad. Hence, the
equilibrium condition is given by
F w w = t - . (6)
The equilibrium number of members of the young generation who stay in the home country is
denoted by  .
* N
9 The domestic wage is determined by  Z FL g  and the foreign wage by
Z w ) 1 ( g - ° . If there is human capital investment ( 1 ) 1 ( and 1 > g - > g Z Z ), both wages in-
                                                
8 For a similar set-up in a related analysis see Andersson and Konrad (2000a and 2000b).
9 This equilibrium condition neglects the possibility that the young generation might have the opportunity to tax
the subsequent generation in the future. This setting can be justified by assuming a short-time horizon for the
young generation and by a singular demographic shock, i.e. a temporarily gerontocratic system (see section 3
for the demographic development in some countries).6
crease. The extent of relative increase depends on the structural parameter g. The higher g is,
the more (less) the domestic (foreign) wage shifts upwards. If the wage net of tax t in the
home country for a worker with a certain human capital investment is lower than the wage
abroad, migration takes place until the domestic net wage is equal to the wage abroad. Hence,
the equilibrium condition is given by equality of the net wages in both countries with
( )
* - N N  members of the young generation emigrating. This emigration increases the domes-
tic net wage w up to the foreign wage level 
F w  for a given amount of education Z and a given
composition of skills g. If, however, the wage net of tax in the home country is higher than the
wage abroad for a given lump-sum tax t, the members of the young generation do not have an
incentive to emigrate. As to immigration, we assume that immigration is not possible. This
assumption can be justified by a median voter approach. If the median voter belongs to the old
generation, the immigration of young people is only allowed up to the level where the old
generation still has the voting power.
1.2. Stage 3: Tax Decision
The old generation maximizes its income by raising a lump-sum tax t from the young genera-
tion taking the emigration decision into account. The income is given by the fixed factor, i.e.
production minus wage payments (
* - N w Y ), plus the tax revenue (
* tN )
* *
t t + - N N w Y max . (7)
The old generation taxes the difference between the domestic marginal product of labor and
the foreign wage at the no-emigration level only (i.e.  N N =
* ). The optimal tax 
* t  is thus
given by 
10
Z w Z F w w L
F ) 1 (
* g - ° - g = - = t . (8)
                                                
10 With  ) ( N Z F F L L g =  and  Z F w
L
g = .7
The old generation cannot gain from raising the tax to a level that induces emigration. If the
tax rate was set above 
* t , emigration would induce an excess burden of taxation that would
be fully borne by the owners of the fixed factor (i.e. the old generation). Hence, taxation in-
duces no emigration: all members of the young generation stay in the home country.
1.3. Stage 2: Education Quantity Decision
In the second stage, each member of the young generation decides on the amount of education
by maximizing the gross wage w minus the tax payments 
* t  and the disutility from education.
For tractability, the disutility is assumed to be a quadratic function of the amount of education
Z




This yields the optimal amount of education 
* Z





w Z . (10)
Equation (10) shows that there is a negative relationship between the education level Z and the
skill composition parameter g. A higher value for g, i.e. a more domestically oriented educa-
tional structure, decreases the outside option of the young generation. This allows the old gen-
eration to extract a larger part of the productivity gain without having to fear emigration. The
prospect of higher future taxes, however, decreases the incentives for the young generation to
invest in Z. The old generation cannot influence the chosen amount of education Z directly; all
it can do is to choose a certain structure g.
1.4. Stage 1: Education Structure Decision
In the first stage, the old generation maximizes its income from the fixed factor and the tax8
revenue by choosing the educational structure g 
11
N N w Y
*
g
t + - max . (11)
The first order condition is given by










w F w L . (12)
The left-hand side shows two opposing effects on the income of the old generation from a














L L L F w
Z
F Z F . (13)
First, the output increases for a given 
* Z . This effect is equal to 
* Z FL . Second, the young ge-
neration decreases the chosen quantity Z of education. This effect is equal to  g ¶ ¶ g
* Z FL .
The sum of both effects  ( ) g - ° 2 / 1 L F w  is the first term of equation (12). For  2 1 < g , this
term is positive; then a marginal increase of g increases this advantage for the old generation.
The right-hand side of equation (12) shows how a marginal increase of g influences the mi-
gration decision of the young generation. Increasing g means that the migration option be-
comes less attractive, which increases the taxation possibilities for the old generation.
12 Dif-
ferentiation of the foreign income of the young generation 
F w with respect to g yields
( ) g - - 1 ) (
2
￿
w . For  1 < g , this term is negative. For the optimum, the term on the left-hand
side has to be negative, too. Hence, the optimal fraction g has to be greater than  2 1  (cf. Fig-
ure 2). This is optimal because the outside option of the young generation becomes less at-
tractive. The difference between the domestic wage rate and the foreign wage rate increases,
thus raising the tax income for the old generation.
                                                
11 Note that Y and 
* t are functions of g.
12 As we know from above, the optimal lump sum 
* t  is set equal to the difference between the wage rate in the
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This equation shows once again that  1 5 . 0 < g <
* .
13
Proposition 1: The old generation has an incentive to set up an educational
system which increases foreign skills (i.e.  1 < g
* ) in order to restrict future
taxation. Education is used as a commitment device by the old generation.
The social planner, who wants to obtain the social optimum for the domestic individuals inde-
pendently of where they live and work, chooses the  Z , g combination that maximizes the in-
come of the fixed factor for the old generation and the domestic and foreign income of labor
for the young generation minus the disutility from education
2
, ) 1 ( ) ( max Z N Z w N N Y
Z
- g - ° - +
g
. (15)
                                                
13 This result is very different to that of Andersson and Konrad (2000b). There, the Leviathan government has an
incentive to tax or to prohibit education for the case of an open economy with zero migration costs where the
highly productive individuals are mobile and the individuals with low productivity are immobile.10
The optimal structure of education g depends only on the relation between the total wage per
efficiency unit for the emigrated individuals and the total wage per efficiency unit for the in-
dividuals at home.
14 It follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that for all g the optimal
amount of education Z is positive. For  1 = g  and  0 = g , it can be optimal that no one emigrates
or that everybody leaves the country respectively.  1 0 < g <  leads to partial migration of the
domestic individuals, in contrast to the no-migration case for which the optimal choice of g of
the old generation without an intergenerational contract is derived.
15
These general results also carry over to a more specific case. Suppose that the domestic
social planner thinks in terms of the domestic country and not in terms of the domestic indi-
viduals, i.e. she is only interested in maximizing domestic output Y minus the disutility from
education (
2 Z N )
2 max Z N Y
I
- . (16)
As she does not need to commit herself to a certain policy and as she only thinks of the do-
mestic country, she invests exclusively in domestically valuable skills ( 1 = g ). Therefore,
equation (3) simplifies to  I Z = . Rewriting the first order condition determines the socially
optimal investment in human capital 
*
S I






Without the feasibility of an intergenerational contract, however, there is a negative relation-
ship between g and Z (see equation (10)). The higher the value for g, i.e. the closer g gets to
the socially optimal level, the less attractive the investment in human capital becomes for the
young generation. Hence, the old generation has to choose a skill composition which can at
                                                
14 See appendix 1.
15 See appendix 1.
16 This result can also be reached for the more general approach in equation (A1) in the appendix by setting
N N = .11
least partly increase productivity in the foreign country (i.e.  1 < g ) in order to induce the
young generation to invest in human capital. From a social planner's point of view, the mem-
bers of the young generation learn too many skills which only increase foreign productivity.
The socially optimal value for the human capital investment 
*
S I  cannot be reached. This can
easily be seen by comparing the amount of domestically valuable human capital 
* g
* Z  with




In the first best, all education is used to increase domestic productivity ( 1 = g ), whereas in
the second best, g is below 1. Due to the distorted skill composition and the distorted educa-
tion decision of the young generation, there is too little investment in human capital. These
results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Without the feasibility of intergenerational contracts, human
capital investment is below the social optimum. There are two sources of ineffi-
ciencies. (1) The structure g of education is distorted towards too many skills
that increase only the foreign productivity. (2) The level of education Z is be-
low the social optimum.
2. Costs of education
To single out the effects of the intergenerational setting, we have so far neglected any mone-
tary costs of education. This section analyses the case where monetary costs C per unit of
education Z are completely borne by the old generation.
18
                                                
17 See appendix 2.
18 The young generation is assumed to bear costs of education only in the form of disutility.12
Only stage 1 of the analysis above is affected. The optimal skill composition 














Taking the costs into account does not change the qualitative results of the analysis. Quantita-
tively, however, the costs lead to a higher optimal value for 
* gc
* * g > gc . (19)
This is intuitively clear when thinking about the following mechanism: a higher g induces the
young generation to choose less education 
*
c Z  because the outside option is less attractive.
This reduces the costs of providing for 
*
c Z  for the old generation. The disadvantage of a
higher g in the form of a lower Z is therefore partially compensated by the advantage of lower
costs. It can be shown that the total investment in human capital 
* * g c c Z  is again below the so-
cially optimal level 
*
c s, I from the point of view of a social planner who is only interested in
the domestic country




c s, . (20)
Proposition 3: Each generation has an incentive to invest in the human capital
of the subsequent generation, even if the monetary costs are fully borne by the
old generation. The human capital investment, however, is again below the so-
cial optimum.
                                                
19 See appendix 3 for all derivations of this section.13
3. Consequences for the welfare state
We have seen that in a mobile, non-altruistic world, increasing the mobility of the young gen-
eration enables the old generation to commit itself credibly to lower tax level in the future.
But what can be concluded in general as to the question: Will there be an erosion of the wel-
fare state? Thinking about Europe, there are some conclusions to be drawn for redistributive
taxation and public pensions. In an economy with wage taxation and mobility of labor, a re-
distributive system cannot survive. The only stable equilibrium is one with no taxation and
consequently no redistribution, as Sinn (1997) shows. However, there are some arguments in
favor of a less pessimistic view. Mobility costs allow a tax up to these costs without inducing
emigration.
20 As these costs are not necessarily exogenous, the government or the old genera-
tion respectively might have an interest in increasing these mobility costs by offering an edu-
cational program with a clear focus on domestically valuable skills. This would increase the
scope for redistributive taxation if, and only if, the young generation was not able to react. In
the model above, however, the young generation can and will react. Consequently, a neces-
sary condition for the survival of a moderate redistributive system in favor of the old genera-
tion is that there is a credible commitment that prevents excessive redistribution.
This paper shows that education can be used as such a commitment device. Each genera-
tion – even if it is not altruistic – has an incentive to increase the mobility of the subsequent
generation in order to commit itself to a low future tax level. This commitment prevents emi-
gration. However, this commitment is expensive. There is a loss due to investments that in-
crease the foreign productivity but not the domestic one. Is there an alternative instrument
allowing commitment with lower costs?
                                                
20 Mobility costs can be of different kinds, comprising language barriers as well as asymmetric information as to
local customs, laws, regulations and not completely harmonized social security systems (Andersson and Kon-
rad, 2000a and 2000b).14
An intergenerational contract seems to be a solution of this problem at first sight. On
closer analysis, however, it becomes clear that the old generation always has the power to use
alternative instruments in order to enforce redistribution in the case of a gerontocracy. But do
we really - or will we in the near future - live in a gerontocratic system? The fact that the
median voter is still clearly younger than the retirement age does not have to be a fundamental
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Own calculations. The graphs show the age of the median voter in Germany, in Europe, and in
an enlarged Europe. The calculation is based on the population predictions of the U.S. Bureau
of the Census (2000).
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000): International Database, http://www.census.gov.
First, the forecasts for the demographic development show that the median voter will get older
and older in the years to come. In Germany, for example, the median voter is today 45 years
old (see Figure 3). Within the next decades, the age of the median voter will increase signifi-
cantly. Second, it is not necessary that the age of the median voter is equal to or higher than15
the retirement age in order to be able to speak of a gerontocracy. It is not unrealistic to assume
that individuals close to the retirement age have similar interests to the retired.
It becomes clear that if we do not yet live in a gerontocracy, we certainly will pretty soon.
So what can be done? In the context of European integration, an intergenerational contract
might be feasible if taxation power is shifted from the national level to the European level.
Demographic predictions show (cf. Figure 3) that the age of the median voter increases par-
ticularly fast in Germany between 2000 and 2050 compared to the European average. In the
European Union, it increases to 57 years, and in an European Union enlarged by eastern
countries that have a more favorable demographic structure it increases to 56 years in the
same period. Hence, an intergenerational contract on the European level might be credible for
a longer period of time compared to one on the German level.
European integration thus has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, the increased
mobility of labor presents a danger for the welfare state by eroding the basis for redistributive
taxation if there is no common tax policy. On the other hand, it also offers new possibilities to
overcome this problem by implementing a common tax and welfare policy. This common
policy might mitigate the intergenerational problem and might allow for a more credible
commitment.
Appendix 1






















































































































































The socially optimal education level is given by (cf. equation 17)





Comparing the socially optimal amount of human capital to the amount realized without a
social planner, we get for  1 5 , 0 £ g <
*
L S F w I Z < g - g Û < g
* * * ) 1 (
* *
￿ . (A4)
This can easily be verified by using equation (14).
Appendix 3
If the monetary costs of C  per unit of education Z are completely borne by the old generation,
only stage 1 of the analysis above is affected. Equation (12) thus becomes
N Z C N w N Y - - t +
g max , (A5)
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￿





æ g - . (A6)17
The interpretation of this equation is identical to the second section with the exception that
there is an additional disadvantageous term on the right-hand side caused by the costs of edu-














It can again be seen that  1 5 . 0 c < g <
*  (for  0 > - C FL ). Thus, taking the costs into account
does not change the qualitative results of the analysis. Quantitatively, however, the costs lead
to a higher optimal value for g than without monetary costs C.
In order to obtain the social optimum for this case, a social planner has to take the production
and the costs of education, i.e. the disutility of education as well as the monetary costs, into
account:
2 max I N I N C Y
I
- - . (A8)
Rewriting the first order condition yields the socially optimal investment in human capital




c s, - =
* . (A9)
In order to show that 




























c s c c I Z £ g .
21 And for  L F C = , it is easy to show
that  0 c s, c c = = g
* * * I Z .
Therefore, it remains to check
                                                
21 See the argumentation on p.10-11.18
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We define  ( )
* * g g - º c c 1
￿
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* . (A16)
The latter follows from the fact that  ú û
ù
ê ë
é Î g 1 ;
2
1
















I c s . (A18)
As a comparison of equation (A17) and (A18) shows, a marginal increase in the costs C
means that the marginal decrease of the socially optimal education level 
*
c s, I   is higher in ab-
solute terms than the marginal decrease of the education level 
* * g c c Z  within the interval19
[ ] L F C ; 0 Î . We know that at the right border of the interval (i.e.  L F C = )  0 c c c s, = g =
* * * Z I , and
so the socially optimal value exceeds 
* * g c c Z  for all C within the interval.
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